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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE RULE IN
PINNEL'S CASE
JOSEPH GoL*

The rule that the promise to pay part of a debt or the
payment of part cannot be consideration for a discharge of the
whole debt has been referred to by Street as one of the "greatest
mysteries of the common law."' This rule is often referred to,
particularly in England, as the Rule in Pinnel's Case.2 For
convenience it will be referred to in this way here, although that
case did not as part of the ratio decidendi involve any such
principle.
There was much discussion in the Year Book period of the
question whether the payment of part of a debt could constitute
satisfaction of the whole debt where part had been accepted by
the creditor on that understanding.3 Since medieval lawyers
insisted that things be dissolved as they be contracted, it was
necessary to find a quid pro quo,4 and there could obviously be
no quid pro quo in the payment of part of a debt. This was not,
however, a doctrine of consideration. It was a principle of
satisfaction, and Pinnel's Case, which contains an obiter statement of the rule, raised no question of consideration. In fact,
in a later case 5 Coke carefully distinguished between the requiremeiits of consideration and satisfaction, holding that a promise
to pay part of a debt could be consideration for a promise to
give a full discharge. There were some cases, some as late as the
end of the eighteenth century, which adopted this view, either
because there were mutual promises which were consideration
* LL. B., 1935, LL. M., 1936, University of London. University
of London Research Scholar, 1936; Assistant Lecturer in Law, University College, University of London, 1937-1939; Research Fellow,

Harvard Law School, 1939-1941.
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Y. B. 33 H. VI. 47. 32 (1455). Y. B. 10 H. VII. 4.4 (1495).

Perkins, Profitable Book, s.749. See also Anon. (1563) Dal. 49.
Anon. (1588) 4 Leo. 81. Penny v. Core (1602) Moore 677.
'See Viner's Abr., Accord. A, ps. 2,3. Y. B. 33 H. VI. 47. 32
(1455). Y. B. 34 H. VI. 43, 4 (1456). Y. B. 9 E. IV. 19. 21 (1470).
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H. VII.
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for each other, or because prompt payment of part was an
advantage to the creditor. 6 These cases did not prevail. The
earlier decisions were misinterpreted as denying the presence
of consideration,7 and in the nineteenth, century the rule became
established as one of consideration. 8 Another consequence of
this confusion was the assumption, also now established as law,
that there can be no satisfaction without consideration.
There has been much criticism of the principle. It is
rarely mentioned without contemptuous reference to its disregard of the realities of modern commercial life. It is said to
be based on the fallacy that money has a fixed value, whereas
this is far from true, whether it be considered from the point
of view of the creditor or of the open market.9 It has also been
objected that the rule fosters bad faith, and that it leads to the
patent absurdity that a promise to pay 99 cents in the dollar is
no consideration, but a promise to pay one cent and give a canary
or tomtit is consideration. 10
As a result of their extreme dislike of the rule, courts have
been eager to discover a consideration in some benefit or possibility of benefit to the creditor, often of a highly fanciful
character. There is a Massachusetts case which is the reductio ad
absurdum of the rule and its encrustation of exceptions."
A creditor had distinct judgments against a husband and wife.
The wife agreed to pay an amount less than her own debt in
satisfaction of the two judgment debts. This sum was not
apportioned between the two debts. The Court pointed out
that if this money had been paid in discharge of her debt only,
there would have been no satisfaction, but since she had paid
in respect of her own debt and that of her husband, on which
she was not liable, there was sufficient consideration for the
creditor's promise of a discharge. There is a more common
'Reynolds v. Pinhowe (1595) Cro. El. 429; Goring v. Goring
(1602) Yelv. 11; Johnson v. Astell (1667) 1 Lev. 198; Monger v. Kett
(1701) 12 Mod. 558; Rose v. Rose (1756) 1 Arab. 441; Heathcote v.
Crookshanks (1787) 2 T. R. 24; Stock v. Mawson (1798) 1 B. & P.
286, 290-291.

'Richard's &Bartlet's Case (1854) 4 Leo. 81; Greenleaf v. Barker
(1590) Cro. El. 193; Covill v. Geffery (1620) 2 Rolle 96.
'Fitch v. Sutton (1804) 5 East 230; Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App.
Cas. 605.
"Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605, per Lord Blackburn;
Ebert
1 v. Johns (1903) 206 Pa. 395, 398, 55 Atl. 1064.
Couldery v. Bartrum (1881) 19 Ch. D. 394, 399.
Barnett v. Rosen (1920) 235 Mass. 244, 126 N. E. 386.
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type of case which involves an almost equal absurdity. To take
one example, a Connecticut decision. The debtor owed $300, for
which the creditor brought an action. The debtor agreed to
pay $150 and the costs and expenses of the action in full discharge of the debt. The costs and expenses together amounted
to $18. It was held there was consideration in these circumstances, because the expenses included the amount payable to
the plaintiff's attorney for his services, which could not have
been recovered from the defendant had the action gone to
judgment.' 2 In another case, in which the plaintiff had consistently accepted less than he was entitled to as wages under
the contract of employment, the Court found consideration in
the fact that the contract was for no fixed period, so that the
periodic renewal of the hiring was a sufficient benefit to the
plaintiff.13
Normally the courts are not required to exercise such
imagination in the discovery of a consideration for the acceptance
of part of a debt in full discharge. The following are a few
examples of more obvious considerations:
A promise to support the payee of a note for the rest of
14
his life in discharge of the note.
The resumption of business relations after severance over
a dispute. 15
The assignment of the future income, uncertain in amount,
of a trust fund.10
The giving of a mortgage, although to secure a less sum.' 7
A promise by the lessee to his lessor to take a partner into
his business for three years, and to borrow a large sum of money,
in return for a reduction of rent.' s
A promise by the debtor to procure the conveyance of a
third party's land to the creditor. 19
"Mitchell v. Wheaton (1878) 46 Conn. 315; Lamed v. City of
Dubuque (1892) 86 Ia. 166, 53 N. W. 105.
Oien v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (1936) 198 Minn. 363, 270 N. W. 1.
1
McGiverin v. Keefe (1906) 103 Ia. 97, 106 N. W. 396.
Erie Forge Co., Ltd. v. Penn Iron Works Co. (1903) 22 Pa.
Super. 550.
I Matter of McCoy (1935) 157 Misc. 281, 283 N. Y. S. 597.
' Cobb v. Malone (1888)
86 Ala. 571, 6 So. 6; Thomas v. Zahka
(1917) 99 Misc. 333, 164 N. Y. S. 193; Trovatten v. Hanson (1928)
175 Minn, 357, 221 N. W. 238.
"Hastings v. Lovejoy (1885) 140 Mass. 261, 2 N. E. 776.
"Reed v. Bartlett (1839) 19 Pick. (Mass.) 273.

RuILE OF

PINNEL'S CASE

Some problems of consideration require fuller treatment:
Giving property in satisfaction
It seems always to have been the law that where the debtor
owed a sum of money, he could give real or personal property
to the creditor in satisfaction of the debt. The Court would not
investigate the value of the property, and if such was the
agreement, there was satisfaction notwithstanding the wildest
inequality between the size of the debt and the value of the
property.2 0 It must be noted, however, that the debtor must
give something of a different nature from that which he is bound
by the contract to provide. If there is a present obligation to
supply twenty cows, the acceptance of ten cows is21no satisfaction
of the obligation, although ten horses would be.
A problem arises whether there is consideration for a
discharge of a debt where property is taken in satisfaction of
the debt, but for some reason a value is put on the property
less than the total of the debt.22 The reason why property,
though, of less value than a debt, can be accepted in extinguishment, is that it is presumed the property has some special value
24
23
to the creditor. It has been held in Missouri, New York,
and fllinois 25 that in these circumstances the presumption is
rebutted, and there is satisfaction only to the agreed value of
26
the property. This appears to be the English view also.
In Strang v. Holmes, decided by the Supreme Court of New
York in 1827,27 the plaintiff sued on a bond conditioned in a
penalty of $7,000 for the payment of $3,000. The defendant
pleaded an accord and satisfaction in the conveyance of land to
the plaintiff by a deed which fixed the value of the land at
I.

"Curley

v. Harris (1865)

11 Allen (Mass.)

112; Hastings v.

Lovejoy (1885) 140 Mass. 261, 2 N. E. 776; Hall v. Swindell (1938)
147 Kan. 382, 76 P. (2d) 769.
2 McGiverin v. Turnbull (1872) 32 U. C. Q. B. 407. Missouri v.
American Electric Co. v. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. (1908) 165 Fed.
283, 287.

" The same problem will, of course, arise where services are

accepted in satisfaction. Morrill v. Baggott (1895) 157 IM. 240, 41
N. E. 639.
' Griffith v. Creighton (1895) 61 Mo. App. 1.
"Blum v. Hartman (1869) 3 Daly 47; Howard v. Norton (1873)
65 Barb 161, approved in Re Freeman (1902) 117 Fed. 680.
'Morrill v. Baggott (1895) 157 Ill. 240, 41 N. E. 639. See also
Tishomingo v. Latham (1913) 37 Okla. 286, 132 Pac. 891.
"Mitchell v. Cragg (1842) 10 M. & W. 367.
= 7 Cow. 224.

L. J.-6
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$2,500. The question argued was whether there could be an
accord and satisfaction of a bond after it had become single.
No argument was based upon the inadequacy of consideration.
In concluding his judgment Sutherland, J., said:
"The sufficiency of the satisfaction cannot be questioned. It was
the conveyance of land, which, like the gift of a horse, hawk or robe,
shall be intended might be more beneficial to the plaintiff than the
money; or otherwise he would not have accepted it in satisfaction."
An early Massachusetts court seemed to think there iiight
still be satisfaction in full, although assessing the value of the
property is presumptive evidence that it is to be accepted in
29
the
satisfaction pro tanto only.2 8 In a Connecticut case
assessed value of the goods was ignored, the Court holding that
they might still be worth more than the assessed sum to the
plaintiff. The fact that he agrees to accept them in full satisfaction is some evidence of that. It may be possible to draw a distinction between the case where the parties fix a price on the
goods as an indication of what they are worth to the plaintiff, and
the case where some measure is adopted, not as indicating tbhe
value of the goods to the plaintiff, but merely as a method for
deciding how much of the goods the plaintiff considers represents
the equivalent of the debt in value to him. The plaintiff may
think that cows to the market value of $1,000 are worth $2,000
to him. It would involve no absurdity to hold in such a case that
giving cows of the market value of $1,000 amounts to a satisfaction of the whole debt if the plaintiff made such a bargain. The
Connecticut decision seems to imply this.
However this problem may be decided, it is reasonably clear
that if the assessment is not made by the parties, or is made by
them for some purpose other than deciding the value of the
goods, there will be satisfaction in full if it is so agreed. In
Lilly v. Verse,, 30 it was agreed that the plaintiff should take
certain property in full satisfaction if on sale it realized a certain
figure, which was less than the debt. The plaintiff took the
property and sold it, the proceeds being more than the figure
fixed by the parties but less than the debt. It was held he could
not sue for the balance. The case was treated as an acceptance
of the property, subject to a condition the performance of which
'0 Howe

v. Mackay (1827) 4 Pick. 44.

Rose v. Hall (1857) 26 Conn. 392.

(1918) 133 Ark. 547, 203 S. W. 31.
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had made the acceptance absolute, and a sale by the plaintiff.
In Savage v. Everrmwn s l a debtor in Pennsylvania agreed to
convey, and the creditor to accept, land in New Jersey, in satisfaction of the debt. To effectuate the agreement the debtor went
into New Jersey and submitted to service. Judgment was
rendered against him by default, and in pursuance of the agreement the creditor purchased the land at the sheriff's sale under
the judgment for a less sum than the debt. These facts constituted a good defense in an action by the creditor. The sale by
the plaintiff was a formal method of passing title, and the price
was of no consequence. Under the agreement the creditor could
have purchased at a nominal price. Obviously in such a case it
could not have been contended that there was satisfaction only
to the extent of that nominal amount.
II.

Payment at a different place, or in a different currency It is not surprising that in the medieval and later cases much
should be made of the fact that payment at some place other
than that at which it was agreed payment should be made is a
benefit to the creditor and sufficient consideration for an abatement of part of the debt. Communications being what they were,
it might be a distinct saving of trouble and expense to the
creditor (and a considerable burden to the debtor) to have
payment at York instead of Westminster. Modern courts are
reluctant to find sufficient advantage to the creditor or detriment
to the debtor in tbhe circumstance of part payment at a different
place. The English Court of Appeal has recently passed upon
the matter in Vanbergen v. St. Edmunds Properties,Ltd. 32 The
plaintiff in that case was trading in London and indebted to the
defendants under a judgment. The plaintiff's case was that the
defendants had agreed that if the plaintiff would pay a sum of
money into a bank at Eastbourne, which is about three hours by
train from London, they would accept that in satisfaction of the
debt and a bankruptcy notice they had issued. The plaintiff had
paid according to this agreement, but the defendants had served
him with the bankruptcy notice. The plaintiff claimed damages
for the breach of the agreement. The trial judge held there was
sufficient consideration to support the agreement, but the Court
of Appeal reversed his decision. Lord Hanworth, M.R., pointed
"

(1872)
Pa.
(1933) 70
2 K.
B.315.
223.
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out that the facts involved no more than a concession to the
debtor. He was going to Eastbourne to raise the money, and
it was for his convenience that it was agreed that he should be
allowed to pay into the bank there. The mere fact of payment at
a different place is not consideration for an abatement, unless it
is shown to have been for the benefit of the creditor. In Saunders
v. Whtitcomb, 33 where a bill payable in London was dishonored
and then paid in part in Massachusetts, the Court held there was
no consideration for a discharge of the whole debt, because the
defendant, who resided in Massachusetts, had not shown that he
had been subjected to any additional expense in making payment
in Massachusetts. He had not had to transfer funds which he
had placed in London. A circumstance which weighs heavily
against a debtor in these cases is the fact that, when a debt is
due, the debtor must seek out the creditor in order to tender
payment to him. If the debtor is allowed to pay elsewhere, that
is more likely to be a voluntary benefit conferred on him by the
creditor than a detriment to the debtor or advantage to the
creditor.3 4
The courts have adopted a similar attitude to payment in
some other currency than that in which payment is to be made
under the original contract. There is a presumption that on
payment in a different currency there is no more than the payment of an equivalent, and payment in the different medium is of
no advantage to the creditor or detriment to the debtor. 35 In a
New York case in which th.e debtor alleged that the debt payable
in American dollars had been satisfied by the payment of a sum
of money in English pounds, which at the current rate of
exchange was not the equivalent of the dollars owed, the Court
said, "I know of no authority for treating English pounds
juridically as a 'commodity,' although it is occasionally so
described in economic or financial literature.' 36 There is,
however, some authority for treating foreign currency as a commodity even in the law. Thus, although in the case of a
domestic currency debt, the creditor, upon breach of the contract, is entitled to interest only, where there is the breach of a
(1901) 177 Mass. 457, 59 N. E. 192.

"Foster County Bank v. Lammers (1912) 117 Minn. 94, 134

N. W. 501.

Saunders v. Whitcomb (1901) 177 Mass. 457, 59 N. E. 192.
Mundler v. Palmer (1917) 162 N. Y. S. 605.
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contract calling for the delivery of foreign currency, he may
sue for tbe difference in the market prices.37 Even domestic
money is sometimes treated as in the nature of a commodity,
as for example, where equity gives a right to follow it while
still identifiable. Anglo-American law has abandoned the
theory that money has no earmark. 38 It seems that for the
purposes of accord and satisfaction and consideration, as for
other matters affecting the legal meaning of money, a distinction
may be drawn between two conceptions. If the parties express
a monetary obligation in terms of a foreign currency, then,
payment of a less sum in another currency is no satisfaction.
If the contract is for the delivery of foreign currency, Dutch
guilders may be treated like Dutch bulbs, and payment of a less
sum in a different currency may be a satisfaction in full.3 9
Even if this distinction does not recommend itself to the
Courts, it is clear that there may be satisfaction where a dispute
arises on a contract as to the currency in which the debt is
payable, and the creditor accepts some currency other than he
claimed, in settlement of the controversy. 40 Again, a compromise may be arranged where there is a dispute as to the
current rate of exchange of a foreign currency, and the creditor
accepts a less sum in a currency other than that which he
41
claimed.
Ill. Payment before the day
It has been uniformly held that where the debtor pays
part of a debt before the debt is payable, there is consideration
for a promise of a full discharge. 42 A common case of this kind
is the payment of part of a note before maturity on an agreement that the part be accepted in satisfaction of the whole.4 3
'Richard
N. E. 532.

v. American Union Bank (1930) 253 N. Y. 166, 170

Nussbaum, Money in the Law (1939) 114.

"Restatement, Restitution (1937) § 202; Mann, The Legal Aspect
of Money (1938) 122 et seq; Nussbaum, Money in the Law (1939) 56.
"Nussbaum, ibid, 411 et seq.
SKomp v. Raymond (1899) 42 App. Div. 32, 58 N. Y. S. 909.
"Mundler v. Palmer (1917) 162 N. Y. S. 605.

'Smith v. Brown (1825) 3 Hawks (N. C.) 580; Brooks v. White
(1841) 2 Mete. (Mass.) 283; Russell v. Stevenson (1904) 34 Wash.
166, 75 Pac. 627; Gilia v. Robbins (1916) 134 Minn. 45, 158 N. W. 807.
" Schweider v. Lang (1882) 29 Minn. 254, 13 N. W. 33; Weiss. v.
Marks (1903) 206 Pa. 513, 56 At. 59; Hamilton National Bank v.

Nicholson (1911) 153 Ia. 369, 133 N. W. 736; Lockhart State Bank v.
Baker (Tex., 1924) 264 S. W. 566; McCoy v. Wynn (1926) 215 Ala.
172, 110 So. 129; Crow v. Gore (1936) 66 App. D. C. 125, 85 Fed. (2d)

291.
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The principle has been applied where sixty per cent was paid in
discharge of notes some of which were due and some of which
44
were not, the part payment being treated as one transaction.
It has been applied where a note is payable on demand, and
part payment is made before demand on the understanding that
it be accepted in full satisfaction.4 5 In one case a note was
secured by a mortgage under which the creditor had the right
on non-payment of interest to declare that the whole of the
principal sum was immediately due. At the date of the part
payment interest was in arrears, but the acceleration clause
had not been exercised. It was held that the acceleration
clause was not self-executing, so that the agreement to accept
the part in satisfaction of the whole was supported by consideration. 4 6 The only factor which the Court takes into account
in deciding the question whether there is consideration is
whether the part payment is made before the date fixed for
the payment of the debt. Thus, in one case, wages, though
earned, were not payable until some future date. Payment of
part of the earned wages before this date in satisfaction of the
47
total sum earned was consideration for a full discharge.
IV.

The debtor's insolvency
In some jurisdictions it has been held that where the debtor
is insolvent, although, of course, not yet adjudged bankrupt,
there is consideration for a discharge in full where the creditor
agrees to accept part only of his debt. The consideration is
found in the circumstance that, were it not for the accord,
the creditor might get nothing at all, or if the debtor becomes
bankrupt, a dividend smaller than the sum the debtor pays
48
voluntarily. It has been so held in New Hampshire,
53
52
5
49
Georgia, 4
Texas,
Illinois,50 California, 1 Iowa,
Maine,
4

DBowker v. Childs (1862) 3 Allen 434.
Bank v. Shook (1898) 100 Tenn. 436, 45 S. W. 338.
4Brady v. Selberg (1936) 154 Ore. 477, 60 P. (2d) 1104.
47
Princeton Coal Co. v. Dorth (1921) 191 Ind. 615, 133 N. E. 386,
134 N. E. 275.
'Frye v. Hubbell (1907) 74 N. H. 358, 68 At. 325.
"Hinckley v. Arey (1847) 27 Me.362.
Curtis v. Martin (1858) 20 Ill. App.557; Winter v. Meier (1909)
151 Ill.
App.572; Siegel v. Cohen (1918) 210 Ill. App.338; Cp. Stein
v. Automatic Electric Co. (1910) 152 Ill. App.392.
Cloyne v. Levy (1915) 26 Cal.App.637, 148 Pac.224.
Stoutenberg v. Huisman (1895) 93 Ia. 213, 218, 61 N. W. 917;
Engbretson v. Seiberling (1904) 122 Ia. 522, 98 N. W. 319; Carten v.
Tackaberry Co. (1908) 139 Ia. 586, 588, 117 N. W. 953.
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Arkansas" and Wisconsin. 56 In :Ninnesota it has been held
that even the debtor's appearance of insolvency, or the creditor's
unfounded belief that the debtor is insolvent, is consideration
for the abatement of part of a debt,57 but in most of the above
jurisdictions the courts insist on actual insolvency.
It has also been held that an express or implied agreement
on the part of the debtor not to take advantage of the bankruptcy
law is consideration for a promise to accept part of a debt in
full satisfaction. Courts taking this view proceed on the
assumption that bankruptcy is an advantage to the debtor,
rather than a misfortune, although some also point out that the
creditor may get more by this arrangement than his dividend
would amount to in bankruptcy. 58 Similarly, it has been held
that a part payment from property which would be exempt
from execution is consideration for a full discharge. 59
In Alabama o and Kentucky 6 1 the circumstance of the
debtor's insolvency is irrelevant. Whether the debtor is insolvent or not, his duty to pay remains unimpaired. It seems
that in New Jersey, whereas insolvency adds nothing to the
effect of part payment, an agreement not to go into bankruptcy
supplies a consideration.6 2 In England it is as clear as it can
be without a direct decision on the question, that part payment
where the debtor is insolvent or where he agrees not to go into
bankruptcy is not consideration for satisfaction in full. Lord
Selborne has framed a generalized statement of consideration in
"Shelton v. Jackson (1899) 20 Tex. Civ. Apps. 443, 49 S. W. 415.
"Merchants' Bank of Macon v. Davis (1847) 3 Ga. 112; Molyneaux v. Collier (1853) 13 Ga. 406. 424.
Miller v. Benton (1936) 192 Ark. 367, 91 S. W. (2d) 263.
"Herman v. Schlesinger (1902) 114 Wis. 382, 400, 90 N. W. 460.
See also Conlan v. Spokane Hardware Co. (1921) 117 Wash. 378,
201 Pac. 26; Gasper v. Mayer (Okla., 1935) 43 P. (2d) 467, 473.

ice v. London & Northwest American Mortgage Co., Ltd.

(1897) 70 Minn. 77, 72 N. W. 286.

"Hinckley v. Arey (1847) 27 Me. 362; Dawson v. Beall (1882)
68 Ga. 328; Hanson v. McCann (1904) 20 Colo. App. 43, 76 Pac. 983;

Engbretson v. Seiberling (1904) 122 Ia. 522, 98 N. W. 319; Frye v.
Hubbell (1907) 74 N. H. 358, 68 Atl. 325; Melroy v. Kenmerer (1907)

218 Pa. 381, 67 Atl. 669; Kuhn v. Kuhn (1912) 171 Ill. App. 298; Hall
v. Swindell (1938) 147 Kan. 382, 76 P. (2d) 769. But cf. Laird v.
Campbell (1880) 92 Pa. 470, 474.
" Meeker v. Requa (1904) 94 App. Div. 300, 87 N. Y. S. 959;

Ward, Murray &Co. v. Young (1905) 40 Tex. Civ. Apps. 294, 89 S. W.
456.
" Pearson and Fant v. Thomason (1849) 15 Ala. 700.
Call v. Pinson (1918) 180 Ky. 367, 202 S.W. 883.
"Levine v. Blumenthal (1936) 117 N. J. L. 23, 186 Atl. 457.
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cases of part payment which excludes the possibility of finding
consideration in these circumstances:
"What is called 'any benefit, or even any legal possibility of benefit' . . . is not (as I conceive) that sort of benefit which a creditor
may derive from getting payment of part of the money due to him
from a debtor who might otherwise keep him at arm's length, or
possibly become insolvent, but is some independent benefit, actual or
contingent, of a kind which might in law be a good and valuable
consideration for any other sort of agreement not under seal."'
V.

Debtor's promise to raise-the money
There are cases in which it has been held that where the
debtor promises to make some specified effort to borrow or raise
the money there is consideration for a promise to accept the
money thus provided in full satisfaction, although it is less than
64
an Arkansas court decided
the debt. In Boshart v. Gardner,
that a promise to accept part of a debt in full discharge, if the
debtor would make an effort to obtain a Federal loan, was
binding where the debtor entered into negotiations for the loan.
There is a similar Missouri decision, in which it was said that
by borrowing the money the debtor makes available a fund
which otherwise would not be liable for the satisfaction of the
debt.6 5 A Colorado court which was called upon to decide this
problem was disinclined to find consideration, but was content
to decide on the ground that it did not appear that there had
been an agreement that the debtor should borrow the money,
or that the creditor knew that the debtor intended to borrow it.66
In Harrimanv. Harriman67 a Massachusetts case, the Court took
a similar stand, holding that an agreement "to raise" the money
did not imply an agreement that the debtor was to borrow it.
New York courts have held consistently that there is no consideration where the debtor undertakes to borrow the money.
The leading case is Runge v. Koop6 s in which the debtor undertook to borrow the money from friends.
"The money, when paid, was to belong, and in fact did belong,
to the defendants. It was to be paid and was paid as their money.

Suppose a debtor agreed to go to work and earn the money, or to
dig for it in the earth, would this furnish a new consideration to
uphold the agreement of the creditor to take less than his conceded
"Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605, 613-614.
(1935) 190 Ark. 104, 77 S. W. (2d) 642.
"Dalrymple v. Craig (1899) 149 Mo. 345, 50 S. W. 884.
Schlesinger v. Schiesinger (1907) 39 Colo. 44, 88 Pac. 970.
" (1859) 12 Gray 341.
(1872) 48 N. Y. 225.
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due? In all cases an embarrassed debtor must make some effort to
procure the money to make a compromise, but no case can be found
holding that the fact that he had agreed to make such effort furnished
any consideration to uphold the compromise. The debtor is legally
bound to pay, and it is utterly indifferent to the creditor where he
gets the money to do it. That is a matter of the debtor, and all his
efforts are expended in simply endeavoring to discharge a legal
obligation. Hence the fact that the defendants agreed to induce
their friends to loan them the money and that they did induce them,
furnishes no new consideration to uphold the compromise."

VI. Disputed and doubtful debts ,
Where the plaintiff accepts in full satisfaction part of a
debt, the liability for which the defendant disputes, the plaintiff
cannot later sue to recover any further part of the claim.
On the other hand, the defendant cannot bring proceedings to
recover the money he has paid on the theory that his original
contention was correct and he was not liable to pay. This was
not always the law.

There are cases from the sixteenth century

onwards, in which it was held that the compromise of a dispute
was not binding where it appeared that the payee or promisee
had no cause of action. 70 This was true not merely where he
had not even a prima facie cause of action, but also where
there was a prima facie cause of action but the promisor would
have had a defense. 7 1 Courts of law would recognize the conclusiveness of a compromise only where the dispute would have
been decided by a court in favor of the payee or promisee,
although it was recognized that liability of the promisor in
72
equity was sufficient for this purpose.
A break was made with the older authorities in the early
nineteenth century. In Leonard v. Leonard in 181273 it was
said that the validity of a compromise does not depend upon a
subsequent adjudication of rights. If the rights are doubtful,
whether that doubt rests upon the facts or the law, a compromise
of them will be binding. This was repeated in Longridge v.
P. 229. Followed in Albrecht v. Johnson (1887) 2 N. Y. City
Ct. 350; Ivy Court Realty Co. v. Knapp (1913) 79 Misc. 260, 139
N. Y. S. 918.
"Holt v. Tilcock (1588) Moore 685; Stone v. Wythipol (1588)
Cro. El. 126; Tooley v. Windham (1590) Cro. El. 207; Mathew v.
Mathew (1595) Moore 702; Fish v. Richardson (1605) Yelv. 56;
Pooly v. Gilberd (1613) 2 Bulst. 41; Rosyer v. Langdale (1650) Sty.
248; Hunt v. Swain (1665) T. Raym. 127; Loyd v. Lee (1718) Stra. 94;
Jones v. Ashburnham (1804) 4 East 455.
' Smith v. Jones (1611) Yelv. 184, 1 Bulst. 44.
"Scott
(1663) 1 Sid. 89.
"2 B. &v.B.Stevens
171, 179-180.
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Dorville in 1821, 7 4 but there are dicta in the judgment of
Holroyd, J.,75 which still suggest that the compromise will not
be binding if the promisor is not liable. Moreover, it appears
from this case that the compromise will be recognized only
where proceedings have been instituted. The locus classicus of
the modern law on the subject of the settlement, compromise or
satisfaction of disputed rights is Callisher v. Bischoffsheim
(1870). 7 6 It was decided that the mere fact that there is no
valid claim does not vitiate th.e compromise. The compromise
is binding if the claim was made in good faith, and it is
immaterial that no legal proceedings were pending, although,
as it was said in Cook v. Wright,7 7 the issue of a writ might be
evidence of the bona fides of a claim. Nor is it necessary that
the plaintiff would have succeeded in establishing his claim.
All that is required is that th.e plaintiff shall have a bona fide
belief that he has a fair chance of success if he pursues his
claim by legal action. In a later case78 Lord Esher questioned
the correctness of Callisher v. Bischoffshein, reverting to something lik'e the older principle that a compromise is not binding
unless there was in fact a good cause of action. This disapproval
of the Callishercase was not essential to the decision of the case
with which Lord Esher was dealing, inasmuch as there was an
absence of the bona fides insisted on in the Callisher case. The
party who has received a sum of money under the compromise
agreement believed that he could extort it from the other party,
because that other would be unlikely to rely on his own shady
conduct as a defense to an action brought by the former. The
party receiving the money had relied entirely on his strategic
position in pressing Wis claim. He had had no bona fide belief
that he was really entitled to make the claim. In Miles v. N. Z.
Alford Estate Co.,7 9 a distinguished Court of Appeal consisting
of Lords Justices Cotton, Bowen, and Fry, gave its support to
Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, and rejected the criticisms of Lord
Esher. The principle adopted in that case is now clearly the
law in both England and the United States.
'5 B. &Ald. 117.
15P. 122.

'L. R. 5 Q. B. 449.
" 1 B. & S. 559.
'Ex. P. Banner (1881) 17 Ch. D. 480.
(1885) 32 Ch. D. 266.
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All that is necessary for the validity of a compromise of a
disputed or doubtful claim is the bona fide belief of the plaintiff
that he has a claim.8 0 In such a case the compromise will be
binding although the plaintiff accepts less than he would otherwise have obtained by an action, or less than he was at all times
claiming.8l It is also binding although the plaintiff would have
recovered nothing, or a less sum than he accepted.8 2 The
dispute may be as to the existence or the extent of the claim.8 3
Where it was clear that one of two persons was liable for a debt,
but both bona fide denied liability, the acceptance of a smaller
sum from one in full satisfaction was supported by consideration 8 4 A claim cannot be doubtful or disputed where by the
terms of the contract 8 5 or a statute88 it has become incontestable.
There is no bona fide dispute where the defendant questions
his liability for the purpose of extracting more favorable terms
from the defendant.87 There can be no accord and satisfaction
of an unlawful claim, even though it has been the subject of a
dispute. 88
"Attwood v.
(1826) 1 Russ. 353; Smith v. Monteith
(1844) 13 M. & W. 427; Wilder v. St. Johnsbury & L. C. Ry.
(1892) 65 Vt. 43, 25 Atl. 896; Rauen v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1906) 129
Ia. 725, 106 N. W. 198; Neubacher v. Perry (1914) 57 Ind. App. 362,
103 N. E. 805; Northern Assurance Co. v. Hunt (1924) 75 Colo. 21, 223
Pac. 1083; Detroit Belt Lacer Co. v. Eowler (1928) 4 S. W. (2d) 651
(Tex. Civ. Apps.); Nixon-Foster Service Co. v. Morrow (1936) 41
N. M.m 67, 64 P. (2d) 92.
" Naylor v. Winch (1824) 1 S. & S. 555; Barlow v. Ocean Ins. Co.
(1842) 4 Metc. 270; Tuttle v. Tuttle (1847) 12 Metc. 551; Partridge v.
Smith (1863) 11 W. R. 714; Sims v. Three States Lumber Co. (1905)
135 Fed. 1019; Kelley v. Hopkins (1908) 105 Minn. 155, 117 N. W. 396.
'Lacy's Case (1853) 4 De G. M. & G. 357; Goodrich v. Sanderson
(1898) 35 App. Div. 546, 554, 55 N. Y. S. 881; Frazier v. Ray (1923) 29
N. M. 121, 219 Pac. 492; Harvey v. Morgan (1937) 166 Misc. 455, 2
N. Y. S. (2d) 520.
"Lost Bonds Case (1880) 15 S. C. 224; Arnold v. Railway Steel
Spring Co. (Mo. App., 1910), 126 S. W. 795; Miller's Estate (1923)
279 Pa. 30, 123 Atl. 646; Hopkins v. Heskett (1933) 189 Minn. 322,
249 N. W. 584.
"Chicago, Rock Is. & Pacific Ry. v. Brown (1904) 70 Neb.
696, 97 N. W. 1038.
"Sexton v. Equitable Life Ass. Co. (1927) 130 Misc. 362, 224
N. Y.S.63.
"Yutz v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. (1936) 264 Ky. 142, 94
S. W. (2d) 326; Friedman v. State Mutual Life Ass. Co. (Mo. 1937)
108 S. W. (2d) 156.
' Demars v. Musser-Sauntry Land Co. (1887) 37 Miim. 418, 35
N. W. 1; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald and Mallory Construction Co. (1895)
44 Neb. 463, 62 N. W. 899; Moss v. Goldstein (1926) 254 Mass. 334, 150
N. E. 91.
"Kidder v. Blake (1864) 45 N. H. 530; Sierra & San Francisco
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In Jacobsen v. Moss,8 9 a recent Iowa decision, a plaintiff
sought to recover the balance of rent due under a written lease.
The defendant pleaded the payment of a less sum in settlement
of a dispute about the rent. This less sum was paid, he alleged,
under a prior oral agreement. The Court held that as evidence
could not be given of this prior agreement in contradiction of the
lease, there was no bona fide dispute. Evidence of the dispute
depended on inadmissible evidence of the parol agreement. This
is a strained interpretation of the meaning of a bona fide claim.
According to this decision, bona fides depend on an imputed
knowledge'of the law of evidence. Contemporary decisions in
other states have rejected this conception of a bona fide claim.
In New Sicilia Loan Co. v. Perry,90 an accommodation maker of
a joint and several note denied that he was liable for more than
a quarter of the note, on the ground that this was his understanding of his obligation when he assumed it. The Rhode
Island Court held parol evidence could be given to show the
dispute as to his liability. Its purpose is only to prove the
dispute, and not to contradict or vary the note. The accord
and satisfaction was not of the defendant's alleged share of
the note, but of his liability on it, whatever it might be. The
implications of the Iowa decision, if logically pursued, are
wider than the Court probably realized. If the lessee under a
lease which is required by law to be in writing is bound by its
terms to pay monthly, and then by agreement with the lessor
pays a less rent yearly in advance in satisfaction of the rent
reserved by the lease, it would follow from Jacobsen v. Moss
that the lessee would not be able to prove the accord and
satisfaction, because that would amount to a parol variation
of the lease. Few, if any, courts would decide in this way,
and there are many decisions impliediy rejecting this
conclusion. 91
The compromise of a dispute must be distinguished from
the case where there has been a difference of opinion between
Power Co. v. Universal Electric & Gas Co. (1925) 197 Cal. 387, 241
Pac. 76; Shortell v. Evans-Ferguson Corp. (1929) 98 Cal. App. 650,
277 P. 519; Adams v. Cribbis (1936) 17 Fed. Supp. 723; Cruze v. Life
Ins. Co. of Virginia (1938) 184 So. 735 (La.).
(1936) 221 Ia. 1343, 268 N. W. 162.
"(1927) 57 R.1. 441, 190 Atl. 457.
"Holman Mfg. Co. v. Dapin (1923) 181 Wis. 97, 193 N. W. 986;
Massachusetts Life Ins. Co. v. Peoples Loan & Investment Co. (1935)
191 Ark. 982, 88 S. W. (2d) 831.
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the parties, and one succeeds in convincing the other of the
correctness of his version, so that there is no longer any dispute
at the date of payment. In such a case, if the defendant pays
the amount claimed by the plaintiff, the plaintiff may later
recover any further sum to which, he is entitled. 92 On the other
hand, it is not necessary that there should be an audible
expression of dissent in order to constitute a dispute. There is
one situation in which the courts have differed in this connection.
The debtor sends a check which bears the legend that it is in full
payment of all claims. The creditor retains it, but in his
opinion more is due, and he intends to recover this balance.
There has been no previous dispute between the parties. Some
courts have held that the creditor is not precluded from suing
to recover what he believes is the unpaid balance of his claim,
on the ground that at the date of the acceptance of the check
there was no dispute.9 3 Recently, an Ohio Court has said that
when a creditor received a check in these circumstances, the
receipt of the check with knowledge that he is claiming more
is itself the recognition of a dispute. 94 The reply which has
been made to this argument is that where there has been no prior
dispute, the creditor is entitled to believe that the debtor has
made a mistake about the amount due. Wh.atever the solution
adopted for the case in which at the time the creditor accepts
the check he believes he has a larger claim, it is clear that if he
has no such belief, but discovers facts later which, induce him to
believe a further sum is due to him, there will be no accord and
satisfaction. In this latter case it cannot be argued that there is
a dispute at the time of the alleged settlement, evefh on the theory
of the cases holding there is a dispute where the creditor
knows at the date of acceptance of the check that he has a larger
claim. 95

It is of some importance to decide precisely what is the
consideration for the satisfaction of a disputed claim. This
"The William Rockefeller (1932) 57 Fed. (2d) 897; Ralph A.
Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Assn. (1938) 94 Utah 97, 75
P. (2d) 669.

" Canadian Fish Co. v. McShane (1908) 80 Neb. 551, 114 N. W.
594; Miller Prince St. Elevator Co. (1937) 41 N. M. 330, 68 P. (2d)
663.
"Underwood v. Browning (1937) 55 Ohio App. 268, 9 N. E. (2d)
707.
, Glucksman v. Board of Education (1917) 164 N. Y. S. 351,
rev'd on other grounds, (1917) 101 Misc. 682, 167 N. Y. S. 1075.
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problem is relevant in connection with certain troublesome
problems which arise as a result of the American view of the
acceptance of money or property tendered on condition that it
shall be in full satisfaction. It has been said that the consideration for the debtor's promise is the creditor's surrender of a
claim, and the consequent freedom of the debtor from the
vexation of litigation. 96 "You do not pay the alleged debt, but
you buy the abstention of the other side from enforcing it. "97
In Cook v. Wright,98 Lord Blackburn criticised the view that the
consideration is "the technical and almost illusory consideration
arising from the extra costs of litigation.'' 99 He preferred to
hold that consideration for the debtor's promise was the detriment to the creditor in the possibility that if he attempted to
sue at some later date he would be less likely to succeed. It
might be more difficult to assemble his evidence, and there would
certainly be additional expense and trouble in again preparing
his case. The Privy Council has stressed the settlement itself
as the consideration.
". .. In such cases the consideration which each party receives
is the settlement of the dispute; the real consideration
is not the
sacrifice of a right, but the abandonment of a claim."'
Not much attention has been paid to the question of consideration for the creditor's acceptance in full satisfaction of less
than the liquidated sum he claimed. It would seem that the
consideration he receives is the part payment itself, or the
promise of it, coupled with the fact that he might recover
nothing at all, since the debtor disputes the debt, if the matter
proceeded to trial and verdict.
VII.

Unliquidated debts
In Adams v. Tapling, decided in 1694,101 it was held that
where the damages claimed by the plaintiff are uncertain, a
lesser thing may be done in satisfaction. A debt is unliquidated
where it cannot be fixed by computation or calculation, but rests
on opinion and can be reduced to certainty only by the assessCallisher v. Bischoffsheim (1870) L. R. 5 Q. B. 449, per Cockburn, C. J.
" Holsworthy Urban District Council v. Rural District Council
of Holsworthy (1907) 2 Ch. 62, per Warrington, J.
(1861) 1 B. & S. 559.
P. 570.
I®Trigge
(1863)
15 Moore
P. C. (1834)
270, 292.
4 Mod. v.
88.Lavalee
See also
Wilkinson
v. Byers
1 Ad. & El. 106.
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ment of a jury.10 2 If the claim can be reduced to certainty by
calculation, the debtor cannot refrain from making the calculation and then assert that the debt is unliquidated.10 3 A payment
of less than the plaintiff's unliquidated claim in full satisfaction
prevents any further recovery by the plaintiff. Pinnet's Case
could hardly apply to such a situation, since it is not possible
to say that there has been a part payment unless the size of the
whole debt is known. 10 4 Th.e consideration which the creditor
receives, where by possibility his claim may be larger than the
payment, is that payment, or the promise of it, coupled with the
chance that a court would in fact award less.
VIII. Negotiable instruments
Cumber v. Wane'0 5 is a decision as well known on this
branch of the law as Pinnel's Case. The plaintiff sued to recover
a debt of £15. The defendant pleaded th.at he gave the plaintiff
a promissory note for £5 in satisfaction, and that the plaintiff
accepted it in satisfaction. It was argued that the plea was ill
on the ground that nothing of a higher nature than the debt
had been given, and since the payment of £5 itself would have
been no satisfaction, a note for that sum could have no other
effect. Reference was made to the cases in which it was held
that one bond cannot discharge another, but no mention was
made of those cases in which it was held that the second bond
could extinguish liability on fhe first where the plaintiff
derived some additional advantage. The defendant relied on
two arguments. The first was that the plaintiff had received
some additional benefit in accepting a negotiable security. The
second was that there had been mutual promises which were a
satisfaction of the preexisting debt. Pratt, C.J., decided
against the defendant. There can be no discharge, he said,
unless the plaintiff receives a reasonable satisfaction, "or at
least the contrary must not appear, as it does in this case."' 1 6
This was probably just a rhetorical flourish designed to support
the real reason, which was that if £5 cannot be satisfaction
554.

54 Shirk v. County Board of Massaco County (1920) 216 Ill. App.

"Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richter (1935) 49 P. (2d) 94
(Okla.).
I Riggs v. Home Mutual Fire Protection Assn. of South Carolina
(1901) 61 S. C. 448, 39 S.E. 614.
(1720) 1 Stra. 426.

See Watkinson v. Inglesby (1810) 5 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 386.
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of £15, a promise to pay £5 should not have greater efficacy.
As for the cases on bonds, he recognized that one could be given
so as to extinguish another, where the obligee's position is
thereby improved. From this it must be taken that he discovered no element of advantage to the creditor in the negotiability of the note which the debtor had given. A good deal
of criticism has been directed against this decision, but overlooking the reference to "reasonableness", which possibly was
an attempt to saddle the courts with the thankless task of
passing on the adequacy of consideration, and starting from
the premise that Pinnel's Case is good law, Lord Camden's view
seemed eminently reasonable. He himself was obviously convinced of the logic of his position. This appears from the fact
that there was a very simple alternative ground, according to
Lord Blackburn, upon which Camden could have disposed of
the case. Lord Blackburn has said10 7 that the replication in
Cumber v. Wane was that the defendant did not give any note
in satisfaction, but for some unexplained reason Lord Camden
decided the case, not on th.e ground that the replication was
good, but on the ground the plea was bad. The Common Pleas
had decided for the plaintiff on the replication. These facts do
not appear in the report in Strange, and one can only assume
that Lord Blackburn obtained them from the record.
A number of American courts have refused to abandon
Camden's position. If the debtor's paymont of a less sum is
no consideration, there isno sufficient reason why his promise to
pay a less sum should be consideration. Now York courts
adopted this argument at an early date. "The debtor's note
amounted to nothing. He only agreed by it to pay at a future
time what he was bound to pay at the present moment, and
afforded no new consideration .. ."108 There are dicta in
at least one case suggesting that the debtor's note for less than
"'Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605, 619-620.
3'Moss v. Shannon (1856) 1 Hilt. 175; Schermerhorn v. Loines

(1810) 7 Johns. 311; Cole v. Sackett (1841) 1 Hill 516; Conkling V.

King (1851) 10 Barb. 373, (1853) 10 N. Y. 440; Parson v. Civer
(1865) 29 How. Pr. 432; Campbell v. Hurd (1893) 74 Hun 235, 26
N. Y. S.458; Stevenson v. Dunn (1893) 3 Misc. 554, 23 N. Y. S. 294;
Forest v. Davis (1897) 20 Misc. 1, 44 N. Y. S. 907. See also Molyneaux v. Collier (1853) 13 Ga. 404; Silvers Box Corp. v. Boynton
Lumber Corp. (Tex. 1927) 297 S.W. 1059. But see Porter v. Talcott
(1823) 1 Cow. 359, 381. Muldoon v. Whitlock (1823) 1 Cow. 290,
306; Nathan v. Smith (1898) 24 Misc. 374, 53 N. Y. S.264.
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the debt, if paid at maturity, would discharge the debt.1 0 9
This would be too wildly illogical, and the suggestion was later
definitely rejected.1 10 The creditor may sue to recover the
balance of the debt. It is arguable, however, that the law as it
is applied, for example, in New York, involves an illogicality
of another kind. It is held that the debtor's own note cannot
satisfy his preexisting debt, but it is also held that the acceptance
of the note suspends the remedy for the original debt.111 It
has been said 1 2 that a note suspends the remedy because its
negotiability is an additional consideration for an express or
implied promise to extend the period of credit. If it is admitted
that there is consideration for this purpose, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that there may be consideration for some
other purpose, i.e., for satisfaction of the original debt. This
argument does not face the courts with, an impasse. It is possible
to avoid it by reference to the fact that the law of negotiable
instruments is the product of the law merchant and not the
common law. It might be argued further that the rationale of
the rule by which the remedy is suspended is merely the
injustice of subjecting the debtor to two actions, one on the
debt, and a second on the note, if transferred by the creditor.
This argument would conveniently dispose of all questions of
consideration.
In England Cumber v. Wane did not survive as good law.
In featheote v. Crookshanks,11 Suller refers to Hardcastle v.
Howard, an unreported decision of 1786, in which Cumber v.
Wane was rejected as incorrectly decided. Lord Ellenborough,
who as counsel in Heathcote v. Crookslnks denied the correctness of Cumberv. Wane, approved that case in Fitch v. Sutton114
in 1804, and said that he was unable to find any report of Hardcastle v. Howard. He, too, preferred strict logic, pointing out
that Cumber v. Wane is supported by the authority of Pinnel's
Case. In Sard v. Rhodes"1 5 the Exchequer held that where the
'Parrott v. Colby (1875) 6 Hun 55.
"Shanley
t

v. Koehler (1903) 80 App. Div. 566, 80 N. Y. S. 679.

Frisbie v. Lamed (1839) 21 Wend. 450; Teaz v. Christie
(1855) 2 E. D. Smith 621; Eisner v. Keller (1871) 3 Daly 485; J.H.
Mohlman Co. v. McKane (1901) 60 App. Div. 546.
"'Myers v. Welles (1843) 5 Hill 463; Nutley Contracting Co. v.
Myers Contracting Co. (1917) 165 N. Y. S. 986.
(1787) 2 T. R.24, 28.
" 5 East 230.
" (1836)
1 M. & W. 153.

L. J.-7
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debtor's note for the same amount as a bill of exchange of which
he was acceptor had been accepted in satisfaction, no action
could be brought on the bill. Cumber v. Wane received its coup
de grace at the hands of Baron Parke, who was not otherwise
distinguished as an innovator, and Chief Baron Pollock in
Sibree v. Tripp.116 Pollock denied that Cumber v. Wane could
be considered a binding authority, since it did not appear from
the report whether the debtor's note was negotiable. The
principle of Sard v. Rhodes could apply where the debtor's
negotiable note is for a less amount than the debt. Both Pollock
and Parke stressed the fact that the note might be likened to a
chattel, which, no one would deny may be given in satisfaction
of a debt larger than its value. Even Sibree v. Tripp need not
have been interpreted as going so far as to decide that the
debtor's note for less than a liquidated debt can satisfy that
debt. Although there are strong indications that the Court
meant to formulate such a principle, it appears that the debt,
in satisfaction of which the note was given, was either unliquidated or disputed. In these circumstances it might well be
held that the note is a sufficient consideration for a discharge
of the whole claim, inasmuch as the creditor's claim is now
reduced to certainty at a figure which he might not otherwise
recover by action. This does not necessarily involve the further
step that there would be consideration for the satisfaction of a
liquidated debt presently due. In fact, this distinction has
been referred to in a New York case in which it was suggested
that the debtor's own note might be a satisfaction of an
unliquidated demand. 117 This restrictive interpretation of
Sibree v. Tripp is no longer possible in England. In Goddard v.
O'Brien,1"8 the creditor accepted his debtor's negotiable check
for a less sum than th.e liquidated debt owed by the debtor.
It was held that there had been a satisfaction of the debt.
This case shows how far the courts are willing to go in this
direction. .The receipt given for the check read: "Received the
sum of £100 by cheque, wbieh is to be in settlement of account
of £125.7s.9d., on said cheque being honored." It would seem
clear from this that the check was not accepted in satisfaction,
and the case stated by the County Court judge strongly
(1846) 15 M. & W. 23.

v. Koehler (1903) 80 App. Div. 566, 80 N. Y. S. 986.
(1882) 9 Q. B. D. 37.

UShanley
"'
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reinforces this impression. On this score Goddard v. O'Brien
has been doubted,119 but this criticism cannot be taken to undermine the principle that the debtor's own note for a less sum may
be accepted in satisfaction of a larger liquidated debt.
In Sibree v. Tripp txe element of negotiability is emphasized
as a new consideration. This has a deceptive air of cogency. At
first sight it would appear that as the creditor may obtain the
money for which the note is given from a third party by
transferring the note to him, he thereby obtains some new
benefit. There is really nothing in this argument where the
original debt would be payable before the note matures. It is
settled that there is no consideration in a part payment made
more promptly than it otherwise would be made, unless payment
is before the due date. Moreover, there is no substantial
advantage to be derived from transferring the note to a stranger
for value. The theory behind this suggested benefit is that
the debtor may not be able to pay the debt, but the creditor
gets some money from a third person. But if the debtor is
unable to pay the amount of the note to the holder, he will be
able to recover from the creditor, who has indorsed it to him. Of
course, the creditor can indorse the note without recourse, but if
he does so he is likely to reduce his chances of disposing of it.
In spite of these objections, reliance is placed upon the element
of negotiability to show a benefit to the creditor. In Sibree v.
Tripp, however, Pollock, C. B., and Parke, B., went further, and
seemed to hold that the note could be considered a chattel, and a
satisfaction on that ground. This view was applied in Curlewis v.
Clark,12 0 in which the debtor gave a blank acceptance signed by
the Earl of Mexborough. This was not, therefore, the simple
case of the debtor's own note given in satisfaction. Actually
the instrument was not a negotiable instrument at all until the
name of a drawer was inserted. Parke, B., said that as the
plaintiff might have accepted a diamond or a chattel of any kind
in satisfaction, there was no reason why he should not be able to
take a blank acceptance. Alderson, B., thought the signature of
the Earl of Mexborough might be worth something as an autograph, but the Court would not investigate the question of its
value. It would follow logically from this treatment of the
"'Hirachand Punamchand v. Temple (1911) 2 K. B. 330, 340, per
Fletcher Moulton, L. J.
(1849) 3 Ex. 375.
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instrument as a chattel that the creditor may accept even the
debtor's non-negotiable instrument in satisfaction. 12 1 Not very
much remains of the rule in Pinnel's Case if this step is taken.
It is now generally recognized that the creditor may accept
in satisfaction from the debtor the bill of exchange or promissory
note of some third person, or the debtor's own bill or note
indorsed or secured by a third person. 122 In such cases there is
obviously a new benefit to the creditor in the additional security,
and a detirment to the debtor in procuring this security, 123 even
though the instrument is for a less sum than the debt. 124 There
is no difficulty in these circumstances in regarding the instrument as a consideration.
The mere fact that such an instrument is given does not
mean that the debt is necessarily extinguished. It is clear that
there must be an agreement to accept it in satisfaction, 2 5 and
in the absence of evidence of an agreement it will be presumed
that the note or bill is given as a conditional payment. 126 By
" Contra: Bradway v. Groenendyke (1899) 153 Ind. 508, 55 N. E.
434. And see James v. Williams (1845) 13 M. & W. 828.
'Boyd v. Hitchcock (1822) 20 Johns. 76; Booth v. Smith (1829)
3 Wend. 66; Glenn v. Smith (1830) 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 493; Abercrombie v. Mosely (1839) 9 Port. (Ala.) 145; Brooks v. White (1841)
2 Metc. (Mass.) 283; Douglass v. White (1846) 3 Barb. Ch. 621;

Jenness v. Lane (1847) 26 Me. 475; Lee v. Oppenheimer (1850) 32

Me. 253; Carriere v. Ticknor (1855) 26 Ala. 571; Reid v. Hibbard
(1857) 6 Wis. 175; Brassell v. Williams (1874) 51 Ala. 349; Argall v.
Cook (1875) 43 Conn. 160; Currie v. Kennedy (1878) 78 N. C. 91;
Bower & Co. v. Metz (1880) 54 Ia. 394, 6 N. W. 551; Whitsett v.
Clayton (1880) 5 Colo. 476; Bolt v. Dawkins (1881) 16 S. C. 198;
Singleton, Hunt & Co. v. Thomas (1882) 73 Ala. 205; Tucker v.
Murray (1893) 2 Pa. D. 497; Neubacher v. Perry (1914) 57 Ind. App.
362, 103 N. E. 805; American Seeding Machine Co. v. Baker (1914)
55 Ind. App. 625, 104 N. E. 524; Vaughn v. Robbins (1923) 254 Mass.
35, 149 N. E. 677; Barret v. Clarke (1928) 226 Ky. 109, 9 S. W. (2d)
1091.
'"But see Kellogg v. Richards (1835) 14 Wend. 116.
'Conkling v. King (1851) 10 Barb. 372, (1853) 10 N. Y. 440;
Webb v. Goldsmith (1853) 2 Duer 413; Stagg v. Alexander (1869)
55 Barb. 70; Bidder v. Bridges (1887) 37 Ch. D. 406; Brown v.
Lowndes County (1918) 201 Ala. 437, 78 So. 815.
1ZGlenn v. Smith (1830) 4 Gill & J. 493; Abercrombie v. Mosely
(1839) 9 Port. 145; Gordon v. Price, (1849) Ired. L. (N. C.) 385; Darnell v. Morehouse (1868) 36 How. Pr. 520.
1 Tobey v. Barber (1809) 5 Johns. 68; Sayer v. Wagstaff (1844)
5 Bear. 415; Kemp v. Watt (1846) 15 M. & W. 672; Stone v. Miller
(1851) 16 Pa. 450; Dolsen v. Arnold (1855) 10 How. Pr. 528; Buckingham v. Walker (1873) 48 Miss. 609; Brown v. Dunckel (1881) 46
Mich. 29; Hunter v. Moul (1881) 98 Pa. 13; Greenwich Ins. Co. v.
Oregon Imp. Co. (1894) 74 Hun 194; Bartlett v. Woodsworth-Mason
Co. (1898) 69 N. H. 316; Tuscaloosa Lumber Co. v. Tropical Paint &
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conditional payment is meant that there is to be an extinguishment of the debt only if the note or bill is paid at maturity.
Since in this case there is really no more than a promise to accept
money, a bill or note for a less sum, even though paid at
maturity, should not be allowed to extinguish a larger debt.12 7
In Massachusetts,' 28 Maine,' 29 Vermont 30 and Indiana' 3 ' it is
presumed in the absence of evidence of agreement to the
contrary that the bill or note is accepted in satisfaction.
In Massachusetts this is true even where the debtor's own note
is given, provided, however, it is negotiable. 132 In some other
cases;' 3 3 there is a tendency to distinguish between contemporaneous and preexisting debts, holding that an instrument given
for the former may be presumed to be a satisfaction. This
distinction does not appear to be very sound, and has been
34
expressly or impliedly rejected in other cases.'
The acceptance of a bill or note as conditional payment only
is not without legal effect, even before payment. There are two
consequences which must be noted. The first is that no action
can be brought on the debt until the maturity of the bill or
note.' 3 5 The second is that as a rule the acceptance of the
Oil Co. (1924) 211 Ala. 258, 100 So. 236; Re Estate of Cunningham
(1924) 311 IM.311, 142 N. E. 740.
" Cp. Webb v. Goldsmith (1853) 2 Duer 413; Stagg v. Alexander
(1869) 55 Barb. 70. But see Jenness v. Lane (1847) 26 Me. 475.
Thacher v. Dinsmore (1809) 5 Mass. 299; Johnson v. Johnson
(1814) 11 Mass. 359; Butts v. Dean (1840) 2 Mete. 76; Amos v. Bennett (1878) 125 Mass. 120; Quimby v. Durgin (1888) 148 Mass. 104,
19 N. E. 14.
1 Mehan v. Thompson (1880) 71 Me. 492; Bunker v. Barron
(1887) 79 Me. 62, 8 Atl. 253; Bryant v. Grady (1903) 98 Me. 389, 57
Atl. 92.
Collamer v. Langdon (1856) 29 Vt. 32; Hadley v. Bordo (1890)
62 Vt. 288, 19 Atl. 476.
11Nixon v. Beard (1887) 111 Ind. 137, 12 N. E. 131; Bradway

v. Groenendyke (1899) 153 Ind. 508, 55 N. E. 434. See also Porter v.
Talcott (1823) 1 Cow. 359, 381, 383; Frisbie v. Lamed (1839) 21
Wend. 450; Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer (1893) 52
Minn. 174, 53 N. W. 1137; Burlesdon v. Langdon (1928) 174 Minn.
264. 219 N. W. 155.
I"'Ely v. James (1877) 123 Mass. 36; Amos v. Bennett (1878)
125 Mass. 120; Quimby v. Durgin (1888) 148 Mass. 104, 19 N. E. 14.
1 Hall v. Stevens (1889) 116 N. Y. 201, 22 N. E. 374; Gallagher
v. Ruffing (1903) 118 Wis. 284, 95 N. W. 117.
Chicago Times v. Benedict (1890) 37 Ill. App. 250; McLean v.
Griot (1907) 118 App. Div. 100, 103 N. Y. S. 129.
"IStedman v. Gooch (1793) 1 Esp. 4; Kearslake v. Morgan
(1794) 5 T. R. 513; Tobey v. Barber (1809) 5 Johns. 68; Booth v.
Smith (1829) 3 Wend. 66; Kendrick v. Lomax (1832) 2 C. & J. 405;
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instrument will determine a lien, at least, where the creditor
negotiates it, although authority is by no means uniform.' 3 6
Negotiation will not, however, prevent the creditor from suing
on the original debt, if at the date of the commencement of the
action he has re-acquired title to the bill or note.13 7 The English
Sale of Goods Act, 1893, provides that a vendor who takes a bill
or other negotiable instrument as conditional payment, which is
dishonored, is to be deemed an "unpaid seller,"' 138 the effect of
which under another section is to give him a lien on the goods
for their price as long as he has possession of them. 139 It has
also been decided that neither the acceptance nor the negotiation
of a bill or note by the vendor, who accepted it on account of the
purchase price of real property, amounts to a relinquishment of
his lien for the unpaid price. 140
It is possible that a bill or note may be accepted as neither
conditional nor absolute payment. It may be given merely as a
collateral security. It then affects neither the debt nor the
141
remedy for it.
It seems that a note or bill will be presumed
to be conditional payment rather than collateral security. 142
IX. Acceptance of a several liability for a joint liability
Where there are joint debtors it was clear at all times that
the acceptance of part of the debt from one debtor could not
operate to discharge him, even though the part payment represented his net liability after deducting the amount he could
Frisbie v. Lamed (1839) 2 Hill 450; Myers v. Welles (1843) 5 Hill

463; Fry v. Patterson (1887) 49 N. J. L. 612.
1Horncastle v. Farran (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 497; Bunney v.
Poyntz (1833) 4 B. & Ad. 568; Simon v. Lloyd (1835) 3 Dowl. 813;
Crisp v. Griffiths (1835) 3 Dowl, 752; Price v. Price (1847) 16 M. &
W. 232; Gunn v. Bolckow, Vaughan & Co. (1875) L. R. 10 Ch.Apps.
491; Re Defries & Sons, Ltd. (1909) 2 Ch. 423.
"' Tarleton v. Allhusen (1834) 2 Ad. & E. 32; Teaz v. Christie
(1855) 2 E. D. Smith 621; Re A Debtor (1908) 1 K. B. 344.
s § 38(1).
"' § 39(1),
Grant v. Mills (1813) 2 V. & B. 306; Ex p. Loaring (1814)
2 Rose 79.
"'Abercrombie v. Mosley (1839) 9 Port. (Ala.) 145; Van Etten
v. Troudden (1874) 1 Hun 432; Torkelson v. Brandon Savings Bank
(1928) 53 S.D. 560, 221 N. W. 371.
' Eisner v. Keller (1871) 3 Daly 485; cf. Darnell v. Morehouse
(1868) 36 How. Pr. 520; Hunter v. Moul (1881) 98 Pa. 13.
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recover under his right of contribution from those jointly liable
with him. 43
Missouri has adopted the following statutory provision:
"It shall be lawful for every creditor of two or mnore debtors,
joint or several, to compound with any and every one or more of his
debtors for such sum as he may see fit, and to release him or them
from all further liability to him for such indebtedness, without impairing his right to demand and collect the balance of such indebtedness from the other debtor or debtors thereof, and not so released."
It was at first decided that this section does not dispense with
the necessity for consideration, so that a mere part payment or
promise thereof could not discharge the whole of the debtor's
liability. 44
More recently, this interpretation has been
repudiated. 145 It was held that "compound" meant no more
than settle amicably. It did not mean, as the earlier court had
held, "compromise" in the strict legal sense. This latter
interpretation deprives the phrase "for such sum as he may see
fit" of its natural meaning. There are similar statutory provisions in New York, Kansas, Ohio, South Carolina and Virginia.
The situation in which a creditor "compounds" with one of
two or more joint debtors must be distinguished from that in
which the creditor agrees to accept the sole liability of one of the
joint debtors in discharge of the others. English courts decided
in two early nineteenth century cases that acceptance of a sole
liability in discharge of joint liability was not supported by
consideration for the creditor. These were cases in which a
debtor agreed to exonerate an outgoing partner on receiving the
promise of the remaining partners to assume the partnership
debt.140 It was held in both cases that the creditor was not
prevented from suing the former partner. A few years later
these cases were in effect overruled in Thompson v. Percival
(1834), 14 7 although they were distinguished on the ground that
the remaining partners had not as in this case given a new bill
of exchange for the partnership debt. All doubt about the
1'3 Smith v. Bartholomew (1840) 1 Metc. 276; Rowland v. Hackel
(1922) 243 Mass. 160, 137 N. E. 265; Caragulian v. Rudd (1933) 282
Mass. 260, 184 N. E. 717; Cp. Goodnow v. Smith (1836) 18 Pick. 414.
" De Buhr v. Thompson (1908) 134 Mo. App. 21, 114 S. W. 557.
Monett State Bank v. Rathers (1927) 317 Mo. 890, 297 S. W. 45.
Lodge v. Dicas (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 612; David v. Ellice (1826)
5 B. & C. 196.
1*05 B. & Ad. 925. See Kirwan v. Kirwan (1837) 2 M. & W.
484, 493, per Parke, B; Watts v. Robinson (1872) 32 U. C. Q. B. 362.
'-
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abrogation of the older doctrine was dispelled by the case of
Lyth v. Ault (1852), 148 in which no new negotiable instrument
was given for the creditor's promise to discharge the former
partner. The Court of Exchequer thought that a different thing
had been given, much the same as if a chattel or something
different from money had been given. In conformity with
settled authority, this imports the possibility of a benefit to the
creditor, and a detriment to the debtor, and the courts will not
investigate the question of the value of the consideration. There
is a fuller discussion of this possible benefit to the creditor in
the opinions of Baron Parke and Baron Alderson. It shows
how eager the courts are to find a new consideration. It was
said that the sole liability might be more beneficial than the joint
because the creditor could not sue one debtor safely where
liability is joint, inasmuch as the defendant might plead in
abatement the non-joinder of his co-contractor. Again, there
might be an advantage in having the sole liability of a rich man
rather than the joint liability of a rich man and a poor man, in
that if the rich man died first, the creditor could be deprived at
law (although not in equity) of the security of that man's
private estate. Alderson suggested that if A and B were both
rich, it would still be desirable to have A's sole liability, because
then the creditor could proceed against A or his estate without
joining any other parties; and the advantage in this respect
becomes all the more obvious, if, instead of B, there are a
hundred persons jointly liable. It might be added that the
creditor of a partnership, where the assets of the firm are
insufficient to satisfy his debt, has not right to payment from the
estate of a deceased partner until the separate creditors have
been paid. This was strongly relied upon in the New York case
of Waydell v. Luer,149 which was taken in subsequent New York
decisions1 50 to have settled the law as it was later settled in
England by Lyth v. Ault, although no opinion on that question
was necessary, since the partner had given the note of a
stranger. Moreover, of the four judges who did express an
opinion, only two favored the doctrine later adopted in Lyth v.
Ault.
7 Ex. 669.
(1846) 3 Denio 410.
'LaFarge v. Herter (1850) 11 Barb. 159; Luddington v. Bell
(1879) 77 N. Y. 138.
'u
'-
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The liability of partners is joint during life, with an added
several liability of their estates on death. If the liability is
joint, but not that of partners, it is more difficult to find
consideration, since a creditor has no right to proceed against
the estate of a deceased joint debtor, unless it be that of the last
survivor. This rule has, however, been modified in some American jurisdictions where by statute this right is expressly
conferred on creditors, or joint liability is also made several.
When liability is joint and several, none of the advantages said
to exist in Lyth v. Ault can be found, nor is there any apparent detriment to the debtor who promises to assume the sole
liability.' 5 1 But accepting what the Court there said of purely
joint liability, or the peculiar liability of partners, it would follow
that the promise to pay a less sum as a several liability in
discharge of a larger joint debt would be supported by
consideration. That less sum could be recovered without the
necessity of joining other parties, and the creditor could compete
with other seperate creditors. If, however, detriment to the
debtor is insisted on, it becomes more difficult to find a
detriment, unless advancing the creditor's right in the administration of the debtor's estate can be said to be such a detriment.
Where, as in England, a debt may be satisfied by the debtor's
own note or bill, a note or bill given by the debtor solely, for
part of a joint liability, in discharge of the whole joint debt,
will satisfy that debt, if so accepted.
After Lyth v. Ault an impression arose that where a partner
gave his sole note, that was a discharge of the joint liability, or
was, at least, presumptively a discharge. 52 The matter was
exhaustively discussed in Carruthersv. Ardagh, an Ontario case
decided in 1873,153 in which this interpretation of the law was
not adopted. In that case a note given by a partnership was
about to fall due, and the plaintiff agreed to renew it. It had
been the practice of the two partners to sign all partnership
notes with their individual names. The creditor and one of the
partners sought the other partner in order to procure his
signature, but as he could not be found, the first partner only
signed the second note. The Court was called upon to decide
Lyth v. Ault (1852) 7 Ex. at p. 671.
the references to Byles on Bills in Carruthers v. Ardagh
(1873) 20 Grant Ch. 579.
25 20 Grant Ch. 579.
'See
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whether in these circumstances the joint liability had been
satisfied by the acceptance of the second note. It held, in a
very learned discussion, that there is no satisfaction in the
absence of a special agreement. There was not evidence here,
apart from the relivery of the old note to the partner who
signed the new, that there was an intention to discharge the
joint liability of the partners. There was strong evidence
against it in the fact that the second partner had been sought
before the second note was signed, and the creditor had joined
in the search. It was, however, emphasized that the agreement
to accept the sole liability of one in discharge of the joint
liability of several need not be express. It may be implied
from the eircumstances.'" In Massachusetts the presumption
that a bill or note is given in satisfaction of a debt applies where
it is given by a single debtor for a joint debt. 155
(To be concluded in the January issue.)

Kirwan v. Kirwan (1834) 4 Tyr. 491; Hart v. Alexander
(1837) 2 M. & W. 484; Winter v. Innes (1838) 4 My. & Cr. 101; Re
Head (1890) 3 Ch, 426; Re Head (No. 2) (1894) 2 Ch. 236.
v. Pond (1861) 2 Allen 474; French v. Price (1833)
'Washburn
24 Pick. 13.
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